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FOREWORD: INTERDISCIPLINARITY
Kathleen M. Sullivan*
In the beginning, there was law. Then came law-and. Law and
society, law and economics, law and history, law and literature, law
and philosophy, law and finance, statistics, game theory, psychology,
anthropology, linguistics, critical theory, cultural studies, political
theory, political science, organizational behavior, to name a few. The
variety of extralegal disciplines represented in the books reviewed in
this issue attests to this explosion of perspectives on the law in legal
scholarship.
This development makes clear that the vocation of the legal
scholar has shifted from that of priest to theologian. No longer is a law
professor successful by virtue of well-informed and detached
normative prescription directed to those toiling at practice,
policymaking and adjudication. No longer is the highest aspiration of
the law professor to restate the law or lead the bar. Instead, legal
knowledge is perceived to advance through techniques of
measurement, explanation and interpretation, the positive and
analytic tools of the social sciences and the humanities.
And yet we continue to owe our jobs as law professors, with our
special place and privileges within the university, to teaching lawyers
the tools of practice. We still publish casebooks and respond to
requests from judges, legislators, and businesses for advice. The
analytic techniques of the law school classroom continue to follow the
ancient professional folkways of taxonomy and synthesis, analogy and
distinction, even as enhanced by power-point slides and quantitative
techniques. The life cycle of many legal theorists includes a period of
policy-oriented prescription, offered in op-eds, public testimony, or
consulting memoranda. We thus live a curiously bifocal existence,
viewing law close up by day, and from an external vantage point by
night, both insiders and outsiders to our profession.
To some of those who practice and apply law, this development
represents decline and fall. A decade ago, in the pages of this law
review, Judge Harry Edwards famously lamented that "many law
schools . . . have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing
abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy,"
thus dissociating the legal academy from the legal profession in a
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centrifugal spiral.1 In his view, law professors no longer spoke
sufficiently directly to judges, litigators or legal policymakers from a
shared internal perspective in a language that was intelligible or
useful. In his view, the article or book that truly concerned law was a
rare occasion for celebration.
To others, especially non-legal academics who toil in the underpaid
precincts of university disciplines outside the basic sciences, this
development represents an unjust windfall. In their view, law
professors who do interdisciplinary work are practicing social science
and humanism without a proper professional license, acting as are
historians,

economists,

or

political

theorists

manquees,

but

nevertheless reaping high salaries and lavish worldly opportunities (at
least by university standards) merely by virtue of having obtained a
law degree. In their view, our erstwhile interdisciplinary articles in the
peculiar venue of student-edited journals represent law office history,
noisy regressions, synthetic social science, or adulterated critique, all
freighted with unnecessary references and footnotes that could sink a
thousand ships. The accompanying emotions of contempt and envy
are tempered only by the nervous suspicion that there may be
mysteries to the legal priesthood inaccessible to the uninitiated, and
mysterious power in the legal sacraments capable of actually affecting
events in the outside world.
I reject both these critiques, and argue here that current trends
toward interdisciplinarity in legal scholarship are cause for excitement,
not lament. The extreme implication of the first critique is that law
schools ought be increasingly partitioned from the rest of the
university, specializing in practical education with little affinity for
other disciplines; the extreme implication of the second critique is that
law schools ought be dissolved as distinct entities and absorbed into
the university's various other departments. The far better third
alternative, in my view, is to retain the distinctive institutional place of
law schools as post-graduate professional schools within the university,
while continuing to lower the barriers to exchange between scholars of
law and other disciplines university-wide. On this third view, the rise
of law-and scholarship has elevated both our knowledge of how law
works and our teaching of how to practice it. Hence the importance
and justified influence of this annual, interdisciplinary book review
issue of this law review.
The argument proceeds in three steps. First, I briefly reiterate the
sometimes overlooked point that law is itself a discipline, not simply a
hologram or pastiche of other disciplines. This feature supports the
institutional autonomy and distinctiveness of law schools. Second, I
note that this discipline, the discipline of law, is itself multidisciplinary,

1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).

May2002]

Foreword

1219

built upon if not reducible into elements of the humanities and social
sciences. Thus, attempts to fragment law teaching, law professors, or
legal scholarship into the "practical" on the one hand and the
"theoretical" on the other are artificial and misleading. Third, I
conclude that interdisciplinarity in legal scholarship is not just an
exercise in consumption by law professors, but has productive utility
both for the university and - as is sometimes overlooked - for legal
practitioners and the many political, corporate and bureaucratic actors
who provide services to society built in some part upon their legal
training.
To begin with, law is itself a discipline. Organizational charts of the
disciplines often focus on content, or the taxonomy of subject matters
studied. Of course, law is a discipline in this sense. Legal rules,.
documents and judgments comprise a rich and complicated body of
texts distinct from novels, equations, or musical scores. And law
involves a rich and complicated body of institutional arrangements
that structure and regulate social order, distinct from the institutional
structures of markets, cultures, and religions.
But a discipline, as the term itself suggests, also represents a
technique, a method of analysis, a way of working. Here too, law is
distinctive. It is a branch of rhetoric that gives normative force to
interpretation and analysis. It is a set of interpretive techniques of
problem-solving that disaggregate and order the messy jumble of facts
through which conflict presents itself. And it is an amalgam of
argumentative and decisional conventions, engrained through
repetition, teachable only through reiterated practice and critique, as
with etiquette, musical performance, or sport.
If you have any doubt that legal method is distinctive, try reading a
non-lawyer's attempt to state the holding of a judicial opinion. With
rare and brilliant exception (Linda Greenhouse, Nancy Rosenblum,
Austin Sarat come to mind), even the cleverest non-lawyers routinely
garble such summaries, seeing holdings in cert. denials, constitutional
rules in statutory constructions, substantive shifts in remedial rulings,
big swings in molecular motions. Legal journalism routinely commits
political mapping fallacies, announcing that the Supreme Court is
"turning right" only to recant a term later to say that "the center
holds." The equivalent in etiquette is the faux pas; in music, singing off
pitch; in sport, the duff, the <link, the mulligan. Lawyers know better
because of our immersion and internalization of our discipline, a social
practice that turns out to be a lot harder than it looks.
But law, though a discipline, is not and never has been an
autonomous discipline. The regulation of social order through a
variety of authoritative texts necessarily interacts in complex and
dialectical fashion with the content and techniques of the social
sciences and the humanities. To take a few familiar examples, criminal
law, in its classification of crimes and its hierarchy of punishment,
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reflects a mixture of deontological and utilitarian theories of
blameworthiness and deterrence. Constitutional law enforces a set of
institutional design mechanisms rooted in liberal political theory about
how to constrain government tyranny. Contract law reflects theories
of personality, will and agency on the one hand and of allocative
efficiency on the other. These theories are often incompletely
articulated in legal materials, and they are sometimes conjoined in
ways a pure humanist or social scientist would deem inconsistent, as if,
for example, philosophers as deeply different as Kant and Mill could
be cited for the same proposition in the alternative. But however
incompletely or inconsistently, legal rules and opinions are always
implicitly theorized. To teach law necessitates fluency in, if not
specialization in, the disciplines that underlie the law in more or less
articulate fashion.
This would be so even if no interdisciplinary books or articles
existed to elaborate the connections. It simply is not possible to
explain a decision limiting the power of the federal government over
the states, for example, without implying a political theory of the
comparative advantages of centralized and decentralized government.
Nor is it possible to explain shifts from individualized tort liability to
social insurance or from the law of landlord-tenant to the regulatory
devices of rent control or land use controls without implying economic
theories of market failure or philosophical theories of distributive
justice. Even without explicit footnotes or cross-references to other
disciplines, such legal rules represent a reflective equilibrium between
particular fact situations and general theories that are necessarily
extralegal. Law is a social practice that embodies a complex
intersection of theories; it is not a theory unto itself.
This much is intuitive to American law students who, unlike those
law students in Anglo- or continental educational systems who
specialize in law as undergraduates, arrive at law school as post
graduates, already steeped when they arrive in the disciplines of the
humanities or social sciences (although basic scientists are usually a bit
flummoxed by what we do). They can see implicit economic theory in
contract remedies and implicit political theory in the law of state and
local initiatives and referenda. Such applications of theory are likely to
appear mid-level, neither as pure as high theory nor as nitty-gritty as
legal or judicial war stories. But it is precisely at that middle level of
generality that law school arbitrages the multiple disciplines
underlying it with the practical problems its teachings are meant to
help solve. Law school training is in large part an exercise in imparting
nimbleness at negotiating disciplinary divides in particular settings.
For these reasons, even work that some would describe as
"doctrinal" in today's legal literature is rarely simply that. The attempt
to explain or rationalize patterns of judicial or administrative decision
making necessarily draws upon implicit theories in order to make
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interpretations, assessments and predictions. To describe Rehnquist
Court decisions in the areas of federalism, voting law and associational
liberty as expressing an overall tendency to favor decentralized
decisionmaking whether by state agencies, political parties, or boy
scout troops is implicitly to draw upon political or social theory,
whether or not Madison or Tocqueville is expressly invoked. To
taxonomize the modes of dispute resolution employed in response to
mass injuries ranging from asbestos inhalation to tobacco use to the
September 11 World Trade Center deaths is implicitly to draw upon
conceptions of distributive justice, whether or not Rawls or Sen is
explicitly referenced. Even student law review notes that chronicle
unresolved issues in lower court litigation, which might seem the last
bastion of pure doctrinalism, implicitly articulate tensions in social
theory, such as the tension between normative pluralism and uniform
human rights norms embodied in the seemingly technical question
whether race discrimination by a charter school constitutes state
action. Legal doctrine interacts dialectically with social practices in a
way that always and everywhere implicates theoretical debates. That
the fluent lawyer might use case names as shorthand for describing our
legal system's provisional resolutions of these debates hardly purges
"doctrine" of its theoretical components.
If law is a discipline, that itself draws upon multiple disciplines,
then what is the role of the self-consciously interdisciplinary work in
law that increasingly characterizes the work of the legal academy?
There are three possibilities: first, that the application of the tools of
other disciplines will improve knowledge about the law and
institutions governed by law; second, that the application of the tools
of other disciplines will improve the practice of law and the quality of
legal rules and institutions; and third, that viewing the law through the
lens of other disciplines will add understanding and knowledge to the
other disciplines.
Before canvassing these possibilities, let me stress at the outset that
each possibility depends upon the work being done knowledgeably
and well across disciplinary boundaries. Just as non-lawyers are
capable of being ham-handed in describing law, legal academics are
capable of being ham-handed in recounting or applying economic,
social and political theory. The optimistic view sees both sides
handling the other's tools with precision and care, free as much as
possible from the exclusionary effects of local jargon, and in a spirit of
mutual collegiality and respect.
The first proposition is perhaps the easiest to establish. Both
positive and interpretive interdisciplinary work adds to legal
knowledge. Positive research looks at the "is" rather than the "ought"
of law, or how the law actually works in practice. Expertise from
economics, social theory, or political theory enables legal scholars to
describe, measure and assess how well legal rules, practices and
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institutions perform at the functions expected of or ascribed to them,
such as the achievement of justice, fairness, equal treatment, social
welfare, or international harmony. Through such research, the
external perspective illuminates the success or failure of those working
within the internal perspective.
The rise of positive research and thus the increasingly empirical
study of law is one of the most dramatic trends in recent legal
scholarship. Do independent directors constrain management? Do
takeover defenses prevent deadweight loss? Do shareholder class
action suits deter management error, confer windfalls on plaintiffs, or
none of the above? Does alternative dispute resolution save
transaction costs? Do concealed handgun laws save lives? Does the
legalization of abortion lower crime rates? Does recession increase the
number of employment discrimination claims? Does affirmative action
increase black income and wealth? Is venture capital a substitute for
bank financing? Does the expansion of state sovereign immunity shift
relative power from the federal government to the states? Do tax
shelters increase productivity? Do judges deprived of sentencing
discretion use charging discretion as a substitute? Does the death
penalty deter crime? Does race determine the allocation of the death
penalty?
Answering each of these questions increases our knowledge of how
law works, whether well or badly along the axis of a function defined
in advance. Such research does not assert normative premises but
takes them as given. This branch of interdisciplinary scholarship
comes closest to the mores of the basic sciences, which test
explanatory hypotheses against observed data. Research in this vein is
often an equal opportunity ideological offender, offputting to trial
lawyers, ADR lobbies, civil rights advocates, and the like, whenever it
puts doubt to conventional wisdom or tendentious assertion.
Interpretive scholarship, drawing on the techniques of philosophy,
literary analysis, history and cultural theory, in contrast, does not
measure legal outcomes against a pre-assigned function, so much as
seek to articulate the function, including the expressive function or
social meaning, implicit in legal materials. Does the presumption
against unconstitutional conditions reflect a philosophical conception
of coercion or a political theory of governmental incentives to
overreach in relation to private ordering? Does a preference for
bright-line rules over flexible standards reflect tacit assumptions about
the trustworthiness of the implementers' exercise of discretion? Did
Brown v. Board of Education help end the racial segregation of public
education?
Do
racial
gerrymanders preserve divisive race
consciousness? Is the effective articulation of universal human rights
possible in a world of fragmented and mutually exclusive local belief
systems? Does the law of the free exercise clause presuppose that
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religious faith is or is not prior to government in the view of its
adherents?
Notice that there is nothing mutually exclusive about pursuing
these two kinds of interdisciplinary work. A single article might well
seek to examine, for example, whether the creation of majority
minority voting districts advantages Republicans in the ensuing
electoral cycle, and whether such gerrymandering conveys a socially
undesirable .message of apartheid (or vice versa). The point is that
both the positive and the interpretive strands of legal scholarship take
a stance outside legal rules, decisions and institutions in order to
describe, explicate, and assess their social role. Such scholarship starts
from the irreverent proposition that nothing in law need be as it is,
and that critical rationality can illuminate whether it's doing what it
claims, and if not, how it got that way, whether through cognitive bias,
ideological skew, factional dominance, path dependency, or cultural
norms.
The question might be asked why law professors need do such
work; why not simply leave all this to scholars in the humanities and
the social sciences? The answer is that legal expertise enables positive
and interpretive legal research to depict institutional reality in all its
complexity, without overly simplifying assumptions. Specialization in
the internal structures and rhetoric of law improves the quality of this
research in both its positive and interpretive dimensions. A scholar
concerned only about the efficiency of intellectual property
monopolies in conserving incentives to create might not take account
of the administrative difficulties of case-by-case adjudication of
infringements. A scholar concerned only about the magnitude of
money flows in international crime might not take account of the
nuances of prosecutorial practice in charging money laundering in
addition to the underlying crime. Internal knowledge of how lawyers
behave improves the external analysis of legal behavior.
Nor does the practice of the external perspective by law professors
necessarily diminish skill at teaching students the internalist skills of
performance. Sometimes external and internal skills simply converge;
many a great composer has been likewise a great musicologist. In my
observation over nearly a decade each teaching at Harvard and
Stanford Law Schools, I have observed many a proud and non
practicing legal theorist revealed as a closet lawyer when, for example,
mooting a colleague's upcoming oral argument or predicting an
awaited decision. Likewise, teaching internalist skills does not
necessarily depend on having them; many a great music teacher or
athletic coach have been less than stellar performers in their own
right. Thus the gains to legal knowledge offered by the increased
interdisciplinarity of legal scholarship pose no danger to the quality of
professional legal education.
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Indeed I would go farther, and assert, as a second proposition, that
increased interdisciplinarity in legal knowledge affirmatively improves
the teaching of law, and thus improves the professional preparation of
lawyers whether they enter legal practice or business or public
policymaking positions. Thus the outpouring of scholarship
represented in this issue, extending the methods of history,
philosophy, literary analysis, political science, psychology, economics,
and so forth to law, can improve rather than derogate from legal
pedagogy. Of course, this depends on keeping the law school tethered
to the production function of its graduates, not the consumption
function of its professors. The application of historical analysis to the
federal rules of civil procedure or literary analysis to the federal
sentencing guidelines is a far cry from abandoning courses on
procedure for seminars on myth, language and law.
Interdisciplinary scholarship can improve the production of
lawyers for the betterment of society in at least three ways. First, and
most straightforwardly, some techniques of other disciplines that may
be taught in law schools provide law students with skills that are
directly useful and applicable in legal settings. A law professor fluent
in the language of the other disciplines for scholarly purposes will
likely convey useful interdisciplinary knowledge in the classroom as
well. Because legal decisionmakers rarely confront problems as strictly
legal ones, labeled with a T for torts or B for bankruptcy, but rather as
messy jumbles of legal, scientific, financial, ethical and institutional
challenges, interdisciplinary expertise in this straightforward,
utilitarian sense is desirable preparation for practice and
policymaking.
For example, a knowledge of statistics enables a litigator to cross
examine expert witnesses or a government lawyer to analyze
departmental data. A knowledge of finance theory enables a
transactional lawyer to better structure debt and equity instruments. A
knowledge of marine biology enables an environmental lawyer to
assess the damage to an aquatic ecosystem for purposes of seeking
administrative or judicial relief. And it would be downright perilous to
teach advanced courses in intellectual property without some
advanced knowledge of the computer science that constructs the
Internet or the structure of the human genome, knowledge that
students in tum will need in practice.
Interdisciplinary knowledge improves the teaching of law in a
second sense as well: it illuminates the tacit theories underlying the
mix of statutes, regulations and judicial precedents that comprise the
law. For example, the first-year curriculum still contains a course in
contracts, as it did a century ago, but law professors steeped in the
literature of law and economics, libertarian social theory, or
distributive justice will teach the architecture of the doctrine in a more
structured and organized way than a professor who simply points out
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that contract cases leaning respectively toward objective and
subjective interpretations of contract formation are mutually
inconsistent. The effective lawyer may still need to employ multiple
theories in pursuing particular outcomes, but it cannot but be helpful
to know which one you're deploying, just as it is useful to know when
you're speaking German and when French.
More subtly, interdisciplinary knowledge that is explicitly
conveyed in legal teaching helps students to absorb, as part of the
social practice of law, the deep structure of the ideological and
institutional tensions that law helps to resolve. Private law subjects are
illuminated as playing out deeper tensions between allocative and
distributive concerns in the operation of markets. Public law subjects
are situated in broader debates about which topics are, and are not,
better decided by majoritarian political processes rather than by
private ordering or specialized expertise. The student with an
architectonic understanding of the larger debates will subsequently
better see how the same tensions reappear in miniature, as smaller
oppositions nested within the larger ones.

Third, the interdisciplinary law professor can elevate the quality of
public debate over any number of topics, from gun control to cloning
to the enforceability of international human rights. Interdisciplinary
legal scholarship gives lawyers better bases for suggesting or assessing
potential law reform, regulatory regimes or shifts in judicial decision
making. Law professors have no superior claim to normative insight
over many other contributors to public policymaking, but are experts
in the mutual translation of legal into social, economic and political
concepts, and vice versa. Deeper immersion in the tools of economics,
history, statistical analysis, and political science can help enhance the
persuasiveness of any policy prescriptions legal scholars do tender to
the public. And legal scholars, by virtue of being lawyers (or in the
case of non-lawyer law professors, steeped by osmosis in legal
folkways like Jane Goodall among the chimps), are more likely than
straight economists or historians to leaven theoretical advice with
concerns about institutional design and practical administrability.
Finally, increased interdisciplinarity in law offers gains not only to
law, but also to the other disciplines within the university. Too often,
the non-legal disciplines see law as a planet unto itself, impervious to
contemporary trends in thought, or slow to awaken to them after a
considerable lag time. But law offers rich material for analysis and
reflection by non-lawyers. The continued lowering of walls erected
between law and other disciplines out of institutional turf battles, or
misguided mutual isolationism, is sure to produce better thought and
analysis on both sides.
Interdisciplinary research is increasingly the touchstone in the
basic sciences; universities such as Stanford, for example, have
ambitious plans to bring biologists, medical researchers and engineers

1226

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1217

together to pioneer new insights and techniques in "bioengineering."
No one thinks these three departments ought to merge, nor their
specialized disciplinary standards be diluted. But the potential gains
from collaboration are evident to members of each of these three
intellectual communities.
Similar gains from collaboration are evident to the scholars who
attend law school workshops in law and economics, law and
humanities, law and history, law and environmental science, law and
philosophy and the like. The law professors at these workshops are as
often as not also great lawyers and teachers of legal practice. The non
lawyers in attendance are as often as not well attuned to the particular
structures and nuances of law. Legal scholars need not choose
between practical and theoretical destinies, nor non-legal scholars be
exiled from the precincts of law. To the contrary, interdisciplinarity
promotes synergy and enlightenment, as the editors of the issue that
follows have so richly and commendably demonstrated.

